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Developing Small Team-based Cyber Security
Exercises
Brandon Mauer, William Stackpole, Daryl Johnson
Networking, Security, and Systems Administration
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, New York
{bem5304,wrsics,dgjics}@rit.edu
Abstract—The growth of the security industry is sparking a
significant interest in well-rounded security professionals.
Regional and national competitions in the academic community
have been developed to help identify qualified candidates to
support this industry. A course has been built to allow students to
improve their skills in this area. This paper describes the process
used to administer events in the support of such a competitive
environment, and the process by which appropriate
infrastructures are developed.
Keywords-cyber security education,
information security










ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A. Abbreviations and Acronyms
Below is a list of terms used throughout this document,
along with their meanings:




security competition;

I.
INTRODUCTION
In September 2011, the authors led a seminar course
entitled "Cyber Defense Techniques." This course places
students into small teams for attack-defend events on small
enterprise networks, mimicking the style of the National
Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition [2]. A major benefit of
providing such an environment is the ability to expose
students to the operations of malicious users that commit
digital crime, improving their skills at defending systems and
networks from attack. In this paper, we discuss the specific
roles and responsibilities of our positions in the course,
elaborate on pertinent details concerning the seminar and its
operation, provide interpretation of the results of the activity
performed by the students, and discuss the lessons taken away
from this unique experience.
II.



CCDC: Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. One
of the United States' premier collegiate cyber security
competitions, held annually, culminating in a national
competition featuring the winning team from each of
the ten U.S. regions in San Antonio, Texas. This
event is the basis for the course layout and structure.
Blue team: the team of students chosen to secure and
defend a small enterprise infrastructure and to
complete business tasks [1,5].



Grey team: the team of students responsible for the
development of blue team infrastructure and the
creation, delegation, and assessment of business
tasks. Normally, these two roles would be split into
two teams, white for business tasks and black for
development of infrastructure [1,4].
Red team: the team of students who will be acting as
penetration testers for a given event. The team's
responsibilities include reconnaissance, vulnerability
identification, infiltration, data theft, and sabotage, as
directed by the grey team [1].
Inject: a business task for the blue team to complete.
Injects are not "mandatory," although failing to
perform an inject resulted in no points being awarded.
Each inject was given an independent maximum
point value and was scored by the grey team after a
predetermined time.
Service check: an operation performed by the event
scoring engine to assess the functional and correct
operation of a network service based on specific grey
team criteria, run at a predetermined interval. A
check was only successful if it fully met all criteria. A
separate check was used for each network service.
Service uptime: The amount of checks assessed by
the scoring engine to be successful, typically
expressed as a percentage.
NSSA: The Rochester Institute of Technology
department of Networking, Security and Systems
Administration [3].
Cyber Defense Techniques: The name of the seminar
course described in this paper. It may also be referred
to as "the course" or "the seminar."
III.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Roles and Responsibilities
A course instructor for Cyber Defense Techniques
(Johnson, Stackpole) is given five primary responsibilities:



To provide overall direction for the course
To lecture students on technologies and techniques
relevant to each team role in the events





To provide counsel, insight, or assistance to student
teams as requested
To ensure fairness of competition by removing bias,
while providing a gradual increase in event difficulty
To assess student performance to provide an
academic grade for the course

A teaching assistant for Cyber Defense Techniques
(Mauer) is given three primary responsibilities:




To provide counsel, insight, or assistance to student
teams as requested
To ensure fairness of competition by removing bias,
while providing a gradual increase in event difficulty
To operate the scoring engine during each event

B. Execution of Duties
The authors have acquired experience at the CCDC on both
blue and red teams. This experience proved to be invaluable in
providing counsel to students when needed. Understanding the
format of CCDC, its goals, and the type of challenges
presented during the competitions helped eliminate confusion
amongst grey teams as to what types of challenges were
appropriate to build into the infrastructure, and streamlined the
communication of ideas between the grey team and us.
Although any team could freely ask questions, this was most
often used by the grey teams to overcome their lack of
experience in doing work in this area. The seminar is an
advanced course; as such, assistance was only given to
students to achieve their desired goals by providing direction
and opinion.
The students were placed into specific teams to try to
achieve three teams of equal measure. To maintain a highquality event free of bias, each event infrastructure was
analyzed to ensure no steps were taken to gain an advantage
from a particular team setup. After the completion of each
event, the next grey team was expected to take into
consideration the lessons learned from the previous event to
provide a more challenging infrastructure for this new event.
Each event infrastructure was subject to approval before being
put into use to verify the appropriate difficulty level was met.
The grey team was also asked to provide all of the
necessary information to properly score a network service so
that the scoring engine could be properly configured. A
configuration file was then written containing this information,
which would be processed by the scoring engine during its
operation. The scoring engine used was commissioned for the
2006 National CCDC, written in C and Perl. Each service
would be checked by the engine every three minutes. A
successful check was recorded if the service provided the
expected response as designated by the grey team. Any other
response was considered a failure, as the checks were designed
by the original programmers to simulate how an end user of a
system would attempt to use the service being checked.

IV.

COURSE STRUCTURE AND LAYOUT

A. General Course Layout
The course was divided into two major components:
lectures and events. The first four weeks of the course were
lectures that provided students an understanding of the basic
components of each aspect of the event. Such topics included
a primer on the use of the nmap network scanner and the
Metasploit Framework for penetration testing, as well as
illustrating techniques for securing core network services such
as the Domain Name System, Internet webservers, and File
Transfer Protocol. Students were also briefed on the roles and
responsibilities of the grey team, with which many students
did not have previous experience. The students were then
placed into teams of four, one for each of the three roles
needed in each event. The student teams would take a different
role for each of the three events to experience red, blue, and
grey team operations. Starting in the fifth week, the remaining
six weeks were used for the completion of three event rounds.
B. Event Layout
Each event lasted for two consecutive course meetings for
a total of three to four hours of activity time, depending on the
setup and teardown time needed to return the lab environment
to its original state. The events were conducted on an isolated
network comprised of eight VMware ESX hypervisor
computers, hosting all of the virtual machines the students
would be using to attack, defend, and monitor the event. This
virtual infrastructure was only in use during course hours to
enforce a supervised and controlled competition environment.
A preparatory meeting was held before the scheduled start of a
given event. At this meeting, the grey team introduced the
specifics of each role to its respective team for that event,
including the type of infrastructure to be defended, the
priorities the blue team should consider for defending the
given infrastructure and network services, and priority of
targets for the red team. The grey team was also given
permission to provide unclear, misleading, or false
information if they chose to do so.
The meeting immediately following the completion of the
event was reserved for debriefing from the grey team; typical
components discussed included any observations they
recorded, score analysis of blue team performance on network
service uptime and inject completion, and any
recommendations they wished to provide. Red team and blue
team members were also invited to share their observations
and opinions.
In between each event was a week-long period that the
grey team would use to consult with us to build the
infrastructure for the next event. Some suggestions to the grey
team included what services were appropriate in the type of
scenario they envisioned to develop, as well as techniques or
ideas on how to introduce hidden vulnerabilities into systems
the blue team would be defending. Modeling the course after
the style of CCDC allows the grey team to provide an
infrastructure that is "broken"; systems may not have been
fully patched and up to date, services could have been left
misconfigured, and hosts may have had backdoors or other

malware already installed on them. As previously stated, each
event was conducted entirely in a location that had no Internet
access, significantly hampering the capability to patch
systems, which provided an additional challenge for both red
and blue teams.
V. COMPARISON TO SIMILAR EVENTS
In the United States, cyber security exercises have existed
since 2001, with the establishment of the U.S. Military Cyber
Defense Exercise (CDX) [4, 6, 7, 8]. The success of such an
exercise has accelerated the growth of additional exercises and
projects in this area. Such documented exercises include a
continuous, live, internal cyber defense activity at the
University of Texas at Austin [9], an international capture-theflag event created by the University of California at Santa
Barbara [10], and a semester length graduate course at Texas
A&M [8]. Each of these events represents a slightly varied
approach to education-oriented cyber security. As the success
of these three events continued, a steering committee was
established to develop a new cyber defense competition,
containing members from the Center for Infrastructure
Assurance and Security (CIAS) at the University of Texas at
San Antonio, the University of Texas at Austin, and Texas
A&M [6]. The resulting competition, the CCDC, is the primary
inspiration for the course described in this paper.
The seminar provides many of the same components
offered at the CCDC and the exercises referenced above, but no
two events are identical. The primary objective shared between
each exercise is to provide the students interactive learning
opportunities in realistic scenarios. As the course described in
this paper is of finite duration, the objectives are more
objective and quantifiable over the prescribed period than the
event developed by the University of Texas at Austin.
Similarly, a capture-the-flag component is not present at the
CCDC or in this course. Therefore, the most direct comparison
can be made to the CCDC and the semester course found at
Texas A&M.
A full-time project by the CIAS at the University of Texas
at San Antonio, the CCDC performs scoring, judging,
infrastructure development and Red Team assessment using
neutral or third party entities and sponsors. The course
described in this paper is smaller in scale than the CCDC, and
temporal and financial constraints have limited the capability
for third party sponsorship and participation in this exercise.
However, by allowing the students to take on those additional
roles, the students gain a well-rounded and more thorough
appreciation for the specific operation of each team as well as
an understanding of the considerable effort needed to bring
such an exercise to fruition. The professional Red Team, White
Team, and Black Team present at the CCDC create an
environment that provides student Blue Teams considerable
opportunity to demonstrate their cyber defense skill set, and the
amount of feedback the professionals can provide is significant.
As proponents of a comprehensive security education, the
authors propose that structuring the course as described above
allows the students to obtain an equivalent amount of
knowledge over the duration of the course in a broader scope,
by participating as a member of each team present in a given
event. The authors recognize the potential for unfair treatment

between student teams in an event, as the students will
eventually design an event as the Grey Team and participate as
Red Team members at some point during the course. As stated
above, grey team infrastructure and inject inspection is required
before an event begins, and the Grey Team as well as the
course instructors actively monitor the competitors throughout
the duration of each event round. The authors hope that
continued experience in this fashion will allow for a more
robust solution to maximize fairness and the opportunity for
students to learn in such an environment.
VI. OBSERVATIONS ON TEAM PERFORMANCE
The interpretation of the results is centric to the interactions
with each grey team for several reasons. It was necessary to
interface with them directly to ensure the event was running as
they intended, as they would be monitoring both teams for the
entirety of the event. Any team-specific problems requiring
attention would be channeled through the grey team to provide
the competing teams more time and to streamline the event as a
whole. To ensure flawless operation of the scoring engine, it
was necessary to monitor its behavior at all times to correct any
issues before they could impact scoring mechanisms.
A. Event One
The experiences observed with each grey team were more
varied than anticipated. Many hours were spent with the first
grey team discussing their plans to develop a fictitious online
medical facility, complete with a website and generated patient
records hosted in an SQL database. This event would showcase
three major components: government compliance and
standards enforcement, misconfigured services, and the
OpenSolaris operating system. With a medical company based
in the United States, patient records are subject to HIPAA
regulations. As a result, the grey team later asked the blue team
to provide a compliance report in this regard. The second most
prevalent feature of this event was that of misconfigured
services; the primary DNS server in this infrastructure allowed
all zone transfers and supported dynamic updates from any
machine. An attacker who is familiar with manipulating DNS
could find a wealth of information about systems on the
network and could easily change DNS information to suit their
needs.
The first grey team worked tirelessly toward developing a
complete, eight node infrastructure with well thought out
business injects, centering on system auditing, service
improvements, policy, and HIPAA regulation. This first event
would set a high bar for the remaining two, as the blue team
visibly struggled with the foreign operating system and had a
low inject completion rate.
B. Event Two
The second grey team, recognizing the high quality
displayed by the previous team, set out to complete an even
more ambitious task--to develop a twelve node server farm
with separate administration machines. This idea was
especially unique for two reasons: the departure from a
standard small enterprise scenario and the inclusion of systems
already “pre-hardened”. Competitions of this style typically
feature a variety of systems, such as client workstations (that

would be used by an employee) and servers running corporate
services and storing company data. In contrast, the server farm
implemented by the grey team was similar to a hosting
company. In this scenario, nearly all of the operating systems
and data residing on blue team servers would be owned by a
customer, a significant departure from the small enterprise
convention. The blue team was also given a guarantee that
some of the systems provided to them by the "customer" have
already been "hardened," although to what extent these systems
were hardened was not divulged. Therefore, the new grey team
was urged to perform security hardening techniques on some of
the systems of their choosing so as not to overwhelm the
second blue team with an increased amount of systems to
protect. This course, while designed to be challenging to the
students, is still only an academic exercise and preparatory
course, and with an approximate event time of three to four
hours, there simply would not be enough time for either team to
fully explore the infrastructure and realize the maximum
benefit from this particular exercise.
The second event saw the return of misconfigured services
and strongly emphasized the adherence to established service
level agreements and contracts the company had entered into
with the customer. The grey team explained to the blue team
that one "site" had an uptime requirement of 75%, the second at
50%, and the third at 25%. While these levels were simplified,
it was effective at forcing the blue team to prioritize the
handling of issues as they arose.
The full infrastructure was not deployed as planned. The
grey team was only able to deliver nine systems by the start of
the event, plus two administration machines and a companywide pfSense software firewall. The red team was able to
capitalize on this and explored further into the network more
quickly due to poor configuration of the firewall and one of the
Active Directory domain controllers. Nonetheless, there was
clear indication that the blue team was aware of the
ramifications of violating their service level agreement with the
customer (a large point deduction). As a result, only one SLA
was not met at the end of the event (50% SLA).
C. Event Three
For the final event, the last grey team chose to implement a
small online casino. This scenario was established early on, but
they were unsure of how to complete their environment. Two
suggestions were offered: a Pluggable Authentication Module
(PAM) configuration that would let anyone log in to the Linux
systems with any password, or a sendmail email server that
would execute arbitrary commands sent to it in email
messages. The grey team eventually chose to implement a
misconfigured PAM to complement a poorly secured web
server.
During the event, the last grey team was very observant and
quick to respond to both the red and the blue teams. In
particular, when they noticed the blue team was not working
cohesively, the grey team initiated a mock fire drill to help the
blue team regroup and renew their efforts. This proved to be
beneficial; at the end of event three, the blue team had the
highest inject completion rate of all three events.

VII. EVENT DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Even though the students were responsible for developing
the infrastructure for each event and writing injects, there was
one component of each event that was featured as a result of
the authors’ collaboration. As a result, each event had one or
two components that not only tied the event together, but
represented a realistic component of a small enterprise to which
the students may have needed more exposure.
A. Event One - OpenSolaris and HIPAA Regulation
Many of the courses taught in the NSSA department at RIT
are taught using Red Hat Linux systems. While Red Hat and its
derivatives are enterprise-friendly and capable operating
systems, they do not constitute such a large portion of
enterprise operating systems that exposing students to other
operating systems would seem unnecessary. Solaris, then,
seemed the most appropriate choice, due to its orientation to
enterprise use, proliferation in technical environments, and its
stability when virtualized on the ESX cluster used to host each
event. Solaris is a complex and sophisticated operating system
that include features offered by few others, and is built on a
tested UNIX core platform. Although there was little
opportunity to showcase the more advanced features, it was our
hope that the exposure to the open-source (and free)
OpenSolaris would be an eye-opening experience. Feedback
from RIT alumni from the NSSA programs indicate it is
evident that Solaris is still used frequently in many types of
enterprises that hire administrators, network engineers, or
security professionals.
It was also important that students understand that they may
be in possession of, or responsible for maintaining the
confidentiality of information and documents. Medical records
are one such type of information. As medical records are
continuing to be made available digitally, regulations such as
HIPAA will be more significant than ever. Companies who do
business in this industry are bound by law to uphold these
requirements concerning digital patient records, while ensuring
doctors and other medical employees, as well as patients, can
access the appropriate medical records in accordance with their
rights. It behooves the persons responsible for the storage,
safety, and security of this information to be vigilant in their
duties to safeguard this information.
B. Event Two - Provider/Customer Model and Service Level
Agreements
We strongly advocated for the development of a server
farm/hosting company scenario for the second event. Server
hosting companies and cloud computing vendors have changed
the landscape in which customers and enterprises do business.
This scenario would also provide practical demonstration of the
issues that hosting companies and cloud vendors face when
providing network services for customers. Combining the
aspects of honoring contractual obligations and service level
agreements together would help students who plan on working
for a service provider to understand the need to develop clearly
defined, enforceable, and effective security policies and service
level agreements. These documents apply to internal business
as well as business between provider and customer. Due to the

evident prioritization of the blue team response, meeting two
out of three SLA requirements is a step in the right direction.
C. Event Three - Dysfunctional Authentication and
Compliance, Revisited
In the final event, the grey team deployed the infrastructure
to the blue team with deliberately misconfigured PAM for all
of the Linux systems. As an online casino, this company could
potentially be responsible for upholding Payment Card Industry
(PCI) compliance for credit card transactions; a database
breach could potentially result in the theft of a large volume of
credit card information. An attacker can do all manner of
malicious things to a system remotely, but the danger is even
greater if the authentication mechanisms that provide most of
the access control to a system do not function properly. This
behavior was particularly difficult to find, as the system would
often accept password changes and other control modifications,
but they were not enforced. Although many students found it
humorous that they could manipulate the system freely, the
realization that this system was very poorly secured as a result
of a simple misconfiguration resounded clearly.
VIII. LESSONS LEARNED
We have taken away several important lessons from these
exercises. The students expressed that they have noticeably
improved their skills, an opinion also shared by the authors.
The students more firmly understand the value of team skills,
and the observations presented in this paper help us to continue
to refine our technique and expand our knowledge of operating
this type of environment in which the students compete and
learn.
A. Student Improvement
Based on our observations, students were not only more
attuned to finding vulnerabilities in systems (both from an
offensive and defensive perspective), but also more easily able
to engage the thought processes of incident response and
system auditing to improve system security. This experience as
a seminar course provides additional learning in areas not
typically covered by core curriculum, and is a superb addition
to academic credentials and provides a broader foundation for
continued study in this area.
B. Teamwork and Interpersonal Skills
The students have noticeably demonstrated a deeper
appreciation of the importance of teamwork in an environment
such as this. CCDC is a team competition, and many
enterprises have teams of people or departments who work
together frequently; consequently, an employee who can work
successfully in a team setting can be very valuable. It was
evident during the events that teams had initial internal friction
over leadership and coordination; fortunately, much of it had
been addressed by the end of the course, but teams who could
not overcome that challenge admitted that they encountered
continued difficulties.
This effect was most profoundly demonstrated by the grey
teams. While the students are capable of engaging in both red
and blue team exercises in other controlled environments, to

our knowledge, the grey team is a unique experience offered in
an environment such as this. Understanding the differences in
approach from competing in an event versus designing,
building, administering, and scoring an event offers a deeper
insight into the true goals of the event. The effects of this
insight go full-circle; an effective grey team can build an
infrastructure that sufficiently challenges the blue team and
gives the red team opportunities to hone their skills. Effective
scoring of injects requires the capability to quantify that the
blue team has achieved the understanding necessary to properly
complete assigned tasks. This, in turn, helps discourage teams
from completing objectives simply to obtain the points each
objective is worth.
C. Knowledge for Future Endeavors
Our involvement in CCDC in the past was beneficial in
helping the students get the maximum benefit from the course,
but this knowledge is only part of the solution. Understanding
the spirit of CCDC, its goals, organization, and structure
ensures the course follows the same path laid out by those
responsible for CCDC; however, the competition is not run by
specific guidelines that mandate certain systems, devices, or
components to be present (or not present). Understanding how
systems work when functioning properly, the way individual
software components work together to produce a functioning
system, and how changes to the system affect its operation
(both seen and unseen) are many of the remaining pieces of this
elaborate puzzle. Engaging in the development of such an
exercise is a large undertaking, which can be improved upon by
steadfast practice and learning from the experiences of others.
As a result, we are confident that we can use this experience as
a foundation for future endeavors in this area and improve the
quality of the course as it matures.
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